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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is based on Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46(b)-16, which jurisdiction is vested in this Court 
exclusively pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is a transaction whereby Appellant entered into an 
agreement with L.A. Young Construction Company ("L.A. Young") 
whereby L.A. Young was allowed to mine, process and haul from 
Petitioner's leasehold, slag in consideration of payment of $.60 
per ton royalty the "sale of tangible personal property" as 
defined by Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(12)(a)(iv) so as to be 
subject to a sales tax? 
2. If such a transaction be subject to a sales tax as 
constituting a sale of tangible personal property, is it 
nonetheless exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2) 
because payment was made by a warrant or check issued by an 
agency of the state of Utah payable to Appellant as a co-payee. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review applicable to each issue 
presented by this appeal is whether the Appellant has been 
substantially prejudiced by the agency having erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-
16(4)(d). 
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Pursuant to Section 64-46-16(4)(d), it is appropriate 
for the reviewing court to review the agency's interpretation of 
law as a question of law with no deference to the agency's view 
of law. The "correction of error" standard is appropriately 
applied to such issues. Bevan v. Industrial Commission, 131 Utah 
Adv. Rptr. 99 (Ct. App. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(12)(a)(iv) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2) 
Utah Admin. Code R. 865-19-42S (1990) 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this case, taxpayer and Appellant Rocky Mountain 
Energy Company ("Rocky Mountain") appeals from an order of the 
Utah Tax Commission dated February 13, 1991. 
The Utah Tax Commission found that the sale of the slag 
material to L.A. Young was a sale of tangible personal property 
and not the sale of an interest in land. The Utah Tax Commission 
stated "there is no evidence presented by the Petitioner which 
would substantiate the Petitioner's claim that the parties to the 
contract intended the Purchase Agreement to constitute the sale 
of an interest in real property rather than the sale of the slag 
material as tangible personal property." 
Further, the Utah Tax Commission determined that "the 
mere fact that Petitioner was named as a co-payee on the warrants 
issued by UDOT does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
the sale of the slag material was a sale to the state of Utah or 
that a contractual relationship existed between the Petitioner 
and the state of Utah. 
As a result of the Utah Tax Commission's order, two 
issues are squarely presented for review: 
1. Is a transaction whereby one party conveys to 
another the right to enter onto the first parties' property and 
mine and remove materials a sale of personal property; and 
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2. Is payment by the state on a state warrant 
inclusive evidence that the state is the purchaser of tangible 
personal property when there are two co-payees on the check and 
where the material is used on a state project. 
FACTS 
The following facts were established by testimony or 
stipulated facts at the hearing,. 
1. Rocky Mountain has leased from Kennecott 
Corporation the exclusive right to mine the slag pile owned by 
Kennecott at Magna, Utah. (Record at page 69.) 
2. Rocky Mountain offered to L.A. Young, and other 
potential highway project biddeirs, two alternatives: 
(a) Rocky Mountciin would mine and load material 
at a fixed price; or 
(b) The contractor could obtain the right itself 
to mine and haul the material against payment of a royalty of 60 
percent per ton. If the latter were chosen, the rock would need 
to be mined at a designated part of the slag pile that would be 
specifically dedicated to that use. (Record at pages 69-70.) 
3. L.A. Young obtained an easement from Kennecott in 
order to have access to the property. (Record at pages 103-105.) 
4. All payments made to Petitioner were made on 
official state of Utah warrants made payable to L.A. Young and 
Rocky Mountain and were specifically payment for royalty at $.60 
2 
per ton for the slag which was incorporated into state projects. 
(Record at pages 34, 70, 100.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Rocky Mountain respectfully submits that with respect 
to the transactions in question, it did not sell "tangible 
personal property" as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-103. That statute makes a clear distinction between the 
sale of property that has been "severed" from real property and 
the sale of "interests in land," which interests include 
traditional possessory and usufructory interests. 
Rocky Mountain also respectfully submits that the 
payment for such materials by a state warrant when the materials 
are clearly placed in a state project meets the requirements of 
Rule 42S of the Tax Commission, Utah Admin. Code R. 865-19-42S 
(1990), and that therefore the transactions in question are 
additionally exempt from sales tax on that basis. 
ARGUMENT 
A. ROCKY MOUNTAIN SOLD TO L.A. YOUNG AN "INTEREST 
IN REAL ESTATE" AS THAT TERM IS USED IN UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 59-12-102(13)(b)(i) 
Pursuant to Section 59-12-102(13)(b)(i), tangible 
personal property does not include "real estate or any interest 
therein or improvements thereon." 
By correlative proposition, tangible personal property 
does include pursuant to Section 59-12-102(13)(a)(iv) "all other 
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physically existing articles or things, including property 
severed from real estate." 
Thus, the statute sets up a clear distinction between 
the sale of an interest in real property and the sale of personal 
property that has been "severed" from the land. 
The Utah Tax Commission sought to analyze this question 
by virtue of whether or not the right to mine and extract the 
slag was a mere "license," or some other interest. This inquiry 
begs the question. The question is whether or not the rights 
granted to L.A. Young constituted an interest in land or is the 
sale of severed personal property, not what label is given the 
interest. Affixing a label to the interest does not aid in this 
analysis. 
It is basic first year law that property interests, or 
estates in land, consist of a great bundle of interests. There 
are present interests, future interests, fee interests, 
possessory interests, usufructory interests and the like. These 
are all interests and estates in land. The right to use a tract 
of property for some time and purpose is just as much an interest 
in that property as is a fee simple absolute. Affixing a label 
such as license, profit a prendre or incorporeal hereditament 
seeks to define the nature and limitations of such an interest. 
The label does not determine whether the interest is realty or 
personalty. 
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The right to enter on and use land owned by another is 
a traditional interest in property. "Such a revocable privilege 
is an "interest in land" as that term has been defined in Section 
5 of the Restatement of Property and as this term is used and is 
treated." 3 R. Powell & P. Ronan, Powell on Real Property § 428 
(1987). 
Utah courts have been less than clear on this concept. 
The analysis has been at times as to the requisites of 
conveyancing instruments, Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hoskins, 465 P.2d 
1007 (1970) , and sometimes as to the nature and substance of the 
transaction without regard to the form of the instruments. 
Stucki v. Ellis, 201 P.2d 486 (Utah 1949). Even in Wasatch 
Mines, the court looked to the underlying "arrangement" between 
the parties and determined that the defendant was acting as a 
"marketing agent" or "distributor" for plaintiff and this did not 
appear to have an interest in the underlying property. 465 P.2d 
at 1010. The modern position is that general principles 
applicable to the construction of contracts applies as well to 
the conveyance of mineral interests. Heiner v. S.J. Graves & 
Son, 790 P.2d 107 Ct. App. 1990. 
In this case, there is no question as to the 
"arrangement" between the parties. L.A. Young had the right, 
power and interest to enter upon a designated section of the 
leasehold and mine and haul the slag. For these rights, it paid 
a $.60 per ton royalty. The nature of the interest in land 
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granted by Rocky Mountain to L.A. Young was such that L.A. Young 
was required to obtain an additional easement from Kennecott in 
order to exercise its right to use the property interests granted 
it by Rocky Mountain. (Record at pages 103 through 107.) Under 
Utah law, such an arrangement is most probably designated a 
"profit-a-prendre" as it consists of a "privilege plus a profit." 
Desert Livestock v. Sharp, 259 P.2d 607 (Utah 1953). On this 
point, Utah law is consistent with that of other jurisdictions. 
Generally, to enter on land and remove a part of the substance is 
considered a "profit-a-prendre." Such an interest is in the 
nature of an incorporeal hereditament. Gerhard v. Stephens, 442 
P.2d 692 (Cal. 1968). 
The point, however, is not so much the label to be 
attached, as to indicate that a right to enter upon the land, use 
the land and extract substances from the land is a typical and 
long-standing "interest" in real property, whatever label be 
attached. 
The record of the transcript is quite clear that Rocky 
Mountain did not sell to L.A. Young anything that had been 
"severed" from the land as required by Section 59-12-
102(13)(a)(iv). Rather, in fact, the Utah Tax Commission stated 
in its order at page 4, "Indeed, even the purchasing option 
offered to L.A. Young by the Petitioner did indicate that neither 
party intended this to be anything more than giving L.A. Young a 
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license to enter onto the property to remove and extract the slag 
material." (Record at page 23.) 
Had Rocky Mountain chose to mine and process the slag 
and subsequently sell it, that would constitute a sale of 
personalty within Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102. From this, the 
Utah Tax Commission falsely reasoned that because such a 
transaction would involve the sale of personalty, a different 
transaction whereby different rights were given to L.A. Young and 
no "severed" property was sold must be treated the same way. 
That reasoning is totally wrong. Quite clearly, the form and 
nature of the transaction dictates whether an interest in real 
property is given or personalty is sold. 
For instance, if one owns property containing coal 
deposits and grants to another the right to explore and mine for 
coal in exchange for a royalty, the subsequent receipt of royalty 
payments are not considered payment for the sale of personal 
property in the state of Utah. There is no difference in this 
situation. As in many situations involving the tax laws, the 
underlying arrangement is critical and dictates how and to what 
extent the transaction is taxable as a sales tax or otherwise. 
Although the Utah Tax Commission did not articulate 
their reasoning in this fashion, they may have determined that a 
"conceptual severance" of the property had taken place by virtue 
of the agreement between L.A. Young and Rocky Mountain. That 
issue was addressed in an affidavit filed by Professor Gilbert 
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Martinez of the University of Utah College of Law. (Record at 
pages 127 through 131.) In that affidavit, after reviewing 
pertinent Utah case law, Professor Martinez concludes that the 
transaction in question involved the sale of an interest in real 
estate and not the sale of personalty that had been conceptually 
severed. (Record at page 131.) 
Applying such reasoning to this case, it is submitted 
that a transaction involving the right to enter upon land, use 
the land, mine the land and extract materials therefrom in 
payment of a royalty, is a transaction involving the sale of an 
interest in land. More importantly, it is clearly not the sale 
of something that has been previously "severed" from real 
property as required by Section 59-102-13(a)(iv). 
B. THE PAYMENT BY A STATE WARRANT EXEMPTS 
THE TRANSACTION IN QUESTION 
Rule 42(S) promulgated by the Utah Tax Commission reads 
as follows: 
"If the sale is paid for by a warrant drawn 
upon the State Treasurer or the official 
disbursing agent of any political 
subdivision, the sale is considered as being 
made to the State of Utah or its political 
subdivision and is exempt from tax." 
The Stipulation of Facts makes it clear that RME 
imposed a strict condition on L. A. Young: RME refused to enter 
into an agreement with L.A. Young to sell access to the rock 
unless L. A. Young and UDOT agreed RME would be paid by UDOT. 
This condition became a part of the agreement between L.A. Young 
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and UDOT. The agreement between RME and L.A. Young would not 
have existed unless this condition was satisfied. 
The effect of this condition was to modify the 
agreement between UDOT and L.A. Young. In order to satisfy RME's 
condition, UDOT and L.A. Young agreed that RME was to be paid by 
a state warrant for the rock delivered by L.A. Young. In legal 
effect, UDOT was purchasing the rock directly from RME. L.A. 
Young was only mining and delivering the rock. The state 
warrants are clearly for the $.60 per ton royalty. The first 
named payee is Rocky Mountain Mineral. Moreover, the material 
was placed on a state project. 
Thus, by rote application of Rule 42S, the transaction 
in question is exempt. 
CONCLUSION 
Rocky Mountain Energy Company respectfully submits that 
based upon the facts and governing legal authority, the ruling of 
the Utah Tax Commission should be reversed and Rocky Mountain 
Energy Company given the following relief: 
1. The imposition of sales taxes by the Utah Tax 
Commission should be reversed; and 
2. The case should be remanded to the Utah Tax Court 
with an order that taxes previously paid by Rocky Mountain Energy 
Company, including penalty and interest, be refunded. 
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